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On August 29, 2016, the FAA is prepared to begin certification of a whole 
new class of airmen to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Dubbed 
“Remote Pilots,” these individuals will be certificated to operate the vastly 
expanding fleet of commercial small unmanned aircraft systems. The FAA 
estimates that the small UAS market will grow to more than 2.7 million commercial 
platforms by 2020 (FAA, 2016b). Many of these new remote pilots will have no 
prior aviation experience operating in the NAS. In developing the recertification 
process for remote operators, the FAA missed a golden opportunity to engage this 
new group of aviators in forging the positive safety culture of the nation’s existing 
manned aircraft pilots. 
 
Remote Pilot Certification & Recertification Process 
 
UAS operators can earn the Remote Pilot certification by completing a 
knowledge exam at an FAA-approved testing facility, based on 12 topical areas 
identified by 14 CFR 107.73 (FAA, 2016c). Alternatively, UAS operators who hold 
an existing aeronautical certificate (other than a student pilot certificate) with a 
current flight review, can complete a the Part 107 small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems ALC-451 training course administered on the FAA Safety Team website 
that addresses seven content areas identified by 14 CFR 107.74 (FAA, 2016a; FAA, 
2016c). Applicants who do not hold an existing aeronautical certificate will be 
vetted by the Transportation Security Administration via a background check 
(FAA, 2016a). Upon completion of an FAA Form 8710-13 [FAA Airmen 
Certificate or Rating Application] in the FAA’s Integrated Airmen Certification and 
Rating Application (IACRA) system an FAA representative or designee will 
validate the applicant’s requirements are met and process issuance of the Remote 
Pilot Certificate with Small UAS Rating (FAA, 2016a). To continue to use small 
UAS flight privileges, a Remote Pilot must complete an initial aeronautical 
knowledge test or recurrent aeronautical knowledge test within 24 calendar months. 
Alternatively, certificated pilots with a current flight review may recertify their 
small UAS privileges via the completion of an initial or recurrent training course 
(FAA, 2016c).  
 
Problem 
 
Safety Culture  
 
 The FAA’s recertification rule follows a traditional and prescriptive, rule-
based approach to Remote Pilot recertification. While this method ensures that 
remote pilots possess the requisite knowledge to adhere to FAA safety and 
operational rules, this approach potentially squanders the opportunity to engage 
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remote pilots within the larger aviation community and foster the development of 
a shared positive safety culture.  
 
The FAA describes a positive safety culture as “characterized by an 
adequate knowledge base, personnel competency, communications, training, 
informed decision-making, and information sharing in which lessons learned and 
best practices are developed and shared” (FAA, 2016d, p. 11). The FAA continues 
by addressing the key traits of a positive safety culture, including “shared values, 
actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing 
goals and demands…there is good communication in the organization, and 
personnel continue to learn and develop through training and coaching” (FAA, 
2016d, p. 11).  
 
The establishment of a positive safety culture among remote pilots is 
significant, as many of these operators are not certificated manned aircraft pilots 
who have been regularly exposed to risk-based safety management training. 
Manned aircraft pilots receive training in hazard identification, risk assessment, and 
mitigation strategies at many stages throughout their training and continuing 
education. Part 141 flight training schools, crew resource management training, and 
a myriad of other training programs establish and continually reinforce the 
importance of safety culture.  Additionally, remote pilots may not necessarily work 
for organizations that have well-established Safety Management Systems, such as 
those typically found in the aviation industry. This potentially leaves this large 
segment of new, professional aviators cut adrift from the safety culture shared by 
the vast majority of aviators. Ultimately, this segregation eliminates the potential 
for communication of critical safety information sharing among this National 
Airspace System user group.  
 
James Reason (1997) codifies a positive safety culture as exhibiting five key 
characteristics: 
 
Informed culture. “Those who manage and operate the system have 
current knowledge about the human, technical, organizational, and environmental 
factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole” (Reason, 1997, p. 195). 
Currently, UAS operators rely on regulatory guidance, FAA policies, and the 
guidance provided by various trade groups such as the Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International to produce an informed culture among remote pilots. 
Unfortunately, this method of information sharing is likely to only generate a one-
way, top-to-bottom flow of information, removing the FAA from receiving critical 
safety feedback. 
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Reporting culture. “An organizational climate in which people are 
prepared to report their errors and near misses” (Reason, 1997, p. 195). The 
relatively limited direct interaction and cross-flow of information between the FAA 
and rank-and-file UAS operators is unlikely to foster this attitude among newly-
certificated remote pilots. To further foster this relationship, the FAA must educate 
operators to use and demonstrate a commitment to honoring non-punitive reporting 
methods, such as the Aviation Safety Reporting System. A failure to foster use of 
this non-mandatory reporting method will likely result in a diminished agency 
capability in predicting and responding to trending safety issues in the UAS 
industry.   
 
Just culture. “An atmosphere if trust in which people are encouraged, even 
rewarded for providing essential safety-related information-but in which they are 
also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior” (Reason, 1997, p. 195). Generally, the FAA has set clear standards for 
acceptable and unacceptable UAS operations. The FAA has published significant 
guidance, including a robust instructional website, B4UFLY application, AC-107-
2 [Small UAS], and revised AC 91-57A [Model Aircraft Operating Standards]. 
Moreover, the agency has partnered with community organizations, such as the 
Academy of Model Aeronautics, to aid in promoting safe operations of UAS. With 
the exception of mandatory post-accident reporting, however, UAS operators 
currently do not have a forum nor are they encouraged to share safety information 
with the agency.   
 
Learning culture. “The willingness and competence to draw the right 
conclusions from its safety information system, and the will to implement major 
reforms when their need is indicated” (Reason, 1997, p. 196). To this point, the 
FAA has tread carefully prior to establishing permanent regulations, such as those 
contained in 14 CFR 107. The agency is acutely aware of the potential dangers 
posed by UAS platforms. Reports of UAS sightings and near encounters by manned 
aircraft operators in the National Airspace System have topped 1,346—nearly 100 
per month between November 2014-January 2016, with most occurring around 
airports and other dense air traffic areas (FAA, 2016e; Gettinger & Michel, 2015). 
The agency also receives UAS encounter, incident, and accident data from the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System, operated by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. A hasty search of the ASRS database for reports containing the 
narrative terms “UAS, drone, or unmanned” produced 229 results (NASA, 2016). 
While it may be premature to accurately judge the effectiveness of the learning 
culture produced by the FAA’s UAS policies, it seems the agency is taking a 
pragmatic and conservative approach to implementing policy. The agency has 
access to multiple sources of UAS safety information. Whether the agency is 
3
Wallace: WINGS Program as a Method of Remote Pilot Recertification
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2016
  
 
   
prepared to implement major reforms, based on changing UAS safety data remains 
to be seen. It is important to note, however, that producing a learning culture 
requires two-way communication between the agency and operators. The FAA has 
not yet facilitated programs to encourage such recurring safety-related discourse 
and training.  
 
Flexible culture. “Involves shifting from the conventional hierarchical 
mode to a flatter professional structure, where control passes to task experts on the 
spot, and then reverts back to the traditional bureaucratic mode once the emergency 
has passed” (Reason, 1997, p. 196). As previously mentioned, it is too early to make 
any judgements on the FAA’s responsiveness to UAS safety-related information. 
The agency’s transition from the 333 exemption process to the new 14 CFR 107 
rules will likely serve as an effective gauge of the organization’s flexibility to 
managing change. 
 
The importance of establishing a safety culture among aviators cannot be 
understated. Establishing a shared mental model of safety-conscious attitudes and 
behaviors among aviation professionals produces a direct and measurable effect on 
the overall safety of the NAS. Ensuring continued aviation safety can only be 
achieved with all NAS elements—users, regulators, and stakeholders—working in 
concert to continually advance the safety benchmark.  
 
Proposed Solution 
 
 The author proposes that the FAA adopt an ongoing training framework 
modeled after the FAA WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program to serve as an alternative 
method of compliance for UAS Remote Pilot recertification. Delivery of training 
material could be conducted via in-person classes, or less ideally, via online 
computer-based training courses. To receive recertification credit, the FAA could 
require attendees to complete training from several topical areas, such as those 
addressed by the existing 14 CFR 107 Remote Pilot recertification requirements. 
Administration of the program could be managed via the FAA Safety Team’s 
current WINGS and Safety Program Airmen Notification System (SPANS) 
programs. 
 
What is WINGS? 
 
 The FAA WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program’s purpose is “addressing the 
primary accident causal factors that continue to plague the general aviation 
community…[the program] is based on the premise that pilots who maintain 
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currency in the basics of flight will enjoy a safer and more stress-free flying 
experience” (FAA, n.d., p. 1).  
 
 The WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program is a voluntary pilot education 
program available to all pilots (FAA, 2011). The program includes learning 
activities and flight training tasks identified to be common causal factors in aviation 
accidents (FAA, 2011). Accident causal factors are organized into three topical 
areas which are revised by the FAA based on changing accident and safety data 
(FAA, 2011). The program is divided into three phases, based on the participant’s 
pilot certificate level: 
 
 Basic WINGS are appropriate for Sport Pilots, Recreational Pilots, and 
Private Pilots, and are based on the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards 
 Advanced WINGS are appropriate for Commercial pilot standards, and are 
based on the Commercial Pilot Practical Test Standards 
 Master WINGS are appropriate for Airline Transport Pilots, Commercial 
Pilots with Instrument Rating, or Flight Instructors  
 
Pilots can complete an unlimited number of phases at each level; however, 
completion of advanced WINGS levels requires successful completion of prior 
level(s). The FAA incentivizes participation in the WINGS program by allowing 
pilots to substitute WINGS phase completion in lieu of a flight review, in 
accordance with 14 CFR 61.56(e) (FAA, 2011). Furthermore, flight instructors who 
conduct WINGS flight training activities can receive credit to renew their Certified 
Flight Instructor Certificate in accordance with FAA Order 8900.1, Vol 5, Ch. 2, 
Sec 11 (FAA, 2011).  
 
While there is no concrete data that proves pilot participation in the FAA’s 
WINGS program ultimately reduces accidents, there are some compelling statistics 
that suggest it likely has a positive effect on aviation safety. An internal FAA report 
evaluated 3,654 general aviation accidents over the course of 2008-2010 (Neville, 
2011). The study examined accident rates among pilots who had completed a phase 
of the WINGS program and those who had not. The results revealed that an 
extremely small, 0.14% (n = 25) of pilots who had completed a phase of WINGS 
in previous 12 months had been involved in an aircraft accident (Neville, 2011). To 
provide some perspective, nearly 8,500 pilots had completed one or more phases of 
the WINGS Program as of December 2010 (Neville, 2011). While this limited 
evaluation of WINGS does not firmly establish the program’s effectiveness at 
improving safety, it is doubtful that the program produced anything but positive 
effects. 
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Succinctly, the FAA WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program is a voluntary 
program designed to actively engage pilots in enhancing their knowledge and 
proficiency to operate safely in the National Airspace System. 
 
Why the WINGS Model Makes Sense 
 
 There are several reasons why adopting the WINGS model for alternative 
UAS Remote Pilot recertification makes sense: 
 
 Establishes a forum. Foremost, the WINGS model establishes a forum 
between remote operators, industry experts, and FAA representatives. This 
approach allows for rapid communication of regulatory, advisory, and UAS 
operational policy changes directly with remote pilots. Furthermore, the model 
creates a forum for remote pilots to access regulatory and subject matter experts to 
directly clarify rules and operational procedures. Such a forum creates an ideal 
platform for the FAA to advertise available safety resources and operational tools. 
Perhaps most importantly, the forum allows the FAA to establish a positive rapport 
among remote operators by demonstrating the agency’s intent to assist operators in 
conducting safe operations rather than merely seek out and punish infractions. Such 
an approach aligns well with the agency’s current national policy of educating UAS 
users to operate safely rather than employing enforcement mechanisms to deter 
unsafe behavior. 
  
 Connects operators to a Community of Practice. One of the key benefits 
of establishing a WINGS-style education program is the synergistic effects 
produced by linking remote pilots into a larger community of practice. Such an 
initiative is an ideal method to facilitate mentorship of remote operators at all 
experience levels. Moreover, this community of practice connects remote pilots 
with other experienced operators and subject matter experts in the field. The 
community of practice reinforces safety by establishing a form of “self-policing” 
and positive group-think among members, exemplifying James Reason’s Just 
Culture traits. Finally, this community of practice creates a sounding board for the 
sharing of safety information and best practices among other remote pilots.   
 
 Reinforces building a positive Safety Culture. Establishing a forum for 
training and sharing safety information is a key step in creating a positive safety 
culture. The initiative directly ties in with the goals articulated by the Safety 
Management System construct and establishes a clear methodology for conducting 
Safety Promotion-related activities. Perhaps most importantly, this initiative allows 
the agency to forge a positive safety culture among a unique group of aviators that 
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would likely not be served by other programs or safety initiatives, such as those 
designed for manned aircraft operators. 
 
 Provides for more effective learning. A WINGS-based program 
transitions remote pilot recertification from merely a rule-based, knowledge 
assessment into a holistic learning culture. This method makes learning a regular, 
recurring process, keeping important operational and safety information at the 
forefront of operator’s attention. Conversely, the existing recertification system, 
tends to encourage rote memorization to pass the biennial knowledge exam. Finally, 
a WINGS-based process eases the financial burden for remote operators to pay for 
re-testing or re-certification at an FAA-approved testing center. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Establishing a positive safety culture is a critical step in ensuring continued 
safety among all NAS users. The FAA’s approach to regulating UAS safety solely 
through knowledge assessment and compliance enforcement simply does not create 
an environment that reinforces the five key elements of safety culture.  To properly 
facilitate the creation of an informed, reporting, just, learning, and flexible culture 
among UAS operators, the FAA must establish an appropriate forum to actively 
engage this new group of aviators to generate personal and individual commitment 
to safety. 
 
The author recommends the FAA consider adopting the proposed FAA 
WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program model as the basis for an alternative method of 
compliance for sUAS Remote Pilot recertification to achieve these ends. 
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